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CHAPTER 11
Social Media Power and  
Election Legitimacy
DAMIAN TAMBINI
INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL MEDIA, PLATFORM DOMINANCE,  
AND ELECTORAL LEGITIMACY
Debate about the Internet and democracy has evolved from starry- eyed 
hope (Rheingold 1995; Tambini 1998), through critical realism (Zittrain 
2008; Howard 2006; Sunstein 2001), to despair (Barocas 2012; Morozov 
2011; Kreiss 2012). Recent elections have called into question the promise 
of the Internet to provide expanding resources for information and delib-
eration (Tambini 2000). Growing numbers of commentators argue that the 
Internet agora has been displaced by the monopolized Internet of “surveil-
lance capitalism” in which a small number of immensely powerful platform 
companies (Zuboff 2015)  provide integrated services of targeted propa-
ganda and misinformation undermining campaign fairness by rewarding 
richer campaigns and those that are increasingly able to bypass existing 
regulatory frameworks. In recent elections, data- driven campaigns, sup-
ported by surveillance technologies that game privacy protection to profile 
voters and target their weaknesses have been widely criticized. (Barocas 
2012; Kreiss 2012, 2016; Howard and Kreiss 2009; Tambini et al. 2017). 
Some, including Epstein (this volume) go so far as to claim that powerful 
intermediaries such as Google and Facebook can and do influence the out-
come of elections.
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At the same time, the shock results of votes in the UK referendum and 
US elections led in 2016 to widespread questioning of the role of social 
media, which was seen as responsible for distributing fake news (Allcott 
and Gentzkow 2017; Tambini 2017), using manipulative psychometric pro-
filing (Cadwalladr 2017), and undermining authoritative journalism (Bell, 
this volume; Allcott and Gentzkow 2017, 211) and ultimately the fairness 
and transparency of elections.
This chapter examines the charge against the social media in recent 
elections, with a focus on the question of dominance: whether the power-
ful position of a few platforms in political campaigning— and particularly 
Facebook— is undermining electoral legitimacy. The focus will be on the UK, 
which has particularly high levels of online and Facebook use, and the refer-
endum in 2016 and general election in 2017, which offer useful contrasting 
examples of recent campaigns. This chapter draws on interviews conducted 
with campaigners on the state of the art in targeted campaigning during 
the referendum in 2016, and a study of online ads used in the 2017 election 
conducted in collaboration with the grassroots group Who Targets Me.
MEDIA AND ELECTORAL LEGITIMACY: THE FRAMEWORK
A number of national and international rules exist to prevent media and 
communications undermining the legitimacy and integrity of elections and 
referenda (Council of Europe 2003; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe 2001). On the international level, intergovernmental organi-
zations such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the UN operate 
election- monitoring projects to ensure free and fair elections. The issue 
of media influence on elections, and government capture of media have 
become increasingly important for these monitoring missions but interna-
tional organizations have done little to deal with the social media challenge.
The OSCE member states must commit to secure free and fair elections, 
and in particular:  “[e] nsure that political campaigning can be conducted 
in an open and fair atmosphere without administrative action, violence, 
intimidation or fear of retribution against candidates, parties or voters; 
(and) [e]nsure unimpeded media access on a non- discriminatory basis” 
(OSCE 2010, 18).
These and the other commitments contained in the OSCE election 
guidelines and similar documents such as the Venice Commission (2010) 
guidelines have led to the development of sophisticated tools for monitor-
ing mass media during elections. According to the OSCE website,
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Election observation missions examine the coverage given to candidates in both 
state and privately owned media. Beyond parties and candidates themselves, 
the media are the most important source of election- related information for 
the public. Their ability to function freely and independently is essential to a 
democratic election. [ . . . ] An observation mission also assesses media laws, the 
performance of regulatory bodies, and whether media- related complaints are 
handled fairly and efficiently.
According to Rasto Kuzel, OSCE election media analyst, “media- 
monitoring projects can provide the general public with benchmarks to 
judge the fairness of the entire election process. This function is vital even 
in those countries that have a long- term tradition of freedom of speech and 
freedom of the media” (cited in OSCE 2017a). There have been instances 
in the past where elections have been scathingly criticized because of the 
media environment. The OSCE report on the 2015 Tajikistan elections for 
example, was critical of a lack of coverage of opposition parties in both 
state and private media (OSCE 2015, 18).
In 2017, the OSCE conducted a monitoring mission to cover UK elec-
tions, as they had done in 2015. But for the first time they added a spe-
cific media component to observe the role of key media companies in the 
election (OSCE 2017b).1 A  full election- monitoring mission of the OSCE 
according to the guidelines now includes monitoring of national media to 
examine evidence of systematic bias or exclusion. A key component of this 
is ensuring that the media are free and there is proper protection for free-
dom of expression, but guidance is clear that liberty is not enough: it is also 
necessary to ensure that media are not captured by special interests, or sys-
tematically biased against groups or interests, and that international stan-
dards such as those of the UN and the Office of Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Council of Europe are respected.
Domestically, national election laws, media regulation, and campaign 
finance rules have been adapted to protect elections from the potential 
threat that mass media propaganda may pose, and in particular to ensure 
that elections are fair, clean and transparent. Election laws establish lim-
its to spending and/ or donations to election campaigns, which are defined 
as printing, distribution, and production of campaign messages, largely 
through the media. The UK for example meets its international obligations 
to hold free and fair elections by implementing the Representation of the 
People Act 1983.
1. A list of election monitoring organizations can be found on the website of the Ace 
Project, a UN- endorsed monitoring organization (Ace Project 2017).
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In addition, media regulation provides for regulation of impartiality/ 
balance in broadcasting, and competition and pluralism in media sys-
tems as a whole. So for example, in addition to UK broadcasters’ general 
requirements to broadcast news that is impartial “in matters of political 
and industrial controversy” they have specific duties during election peri-
ods: “Due weight must be given to the coverage of major parties during the 
election period. Broadcasters must also consider giving appropriate cov-
erage to other parties and independent candidates with significant views 
and perspectives.”2 The UK media regulator Ofcom bases its assessment of 
what is a major party on previous electoral performance, but is likely in the 
future to delegate some of these decisions to broadcasters, who will remain 
bound by their general duties of impartiality.
While the overall objectives of election law and monitoring are similar in 
mature democracies (to make sure elections are free, fair, and transparent), 
means vary. Most countries control spending or donations, provide free but 
rationed political advertising on TV, and operate strict transparency and 
disclosure rules for parties and campaigns. And during the past 50 years 
in which broadcasting, most recently TV, has been the dominant medium, 
broadcasters have been subject to strict obligations to ensure that their 
potential to influence an election is controlled. Not only do most— at least 
in Europe— have balance and impartiality obligations, their role in politi-
cal advertising is also regulated. For example, many democracies, includ-
ing the UK, France Spain, Denmark, and Ireland operate complete bans on 
political advertising on TV (see Tambini et al. 2017; Holz- Bacha and Kaid 
2006; Falguera, Jones, and Ohman 2014; see also Piccio 2016) and others 
implement partial bans. Italy for example permits it only on local TV. No 
such rules exist for social media.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTION LEGITIMACY
Despite national and international standards, “electoral legitimacy” 
is not a legal concept. International organizations do not inspect elec-
tions to make sure they conform to the rules, and blacklist those that do 
not. Rather it is a social construct (Suchmann 1995). Election monitors 
generally write descriptive reports on elections rather than unequivo-
cal endorsements or condemnation. The absence of legitimacy is gen-
erally signaled not only by statements of international organizations 
2. The UK Communications Regulator Ofcom operates a specific code that broadcast 
licensees must adhere to during election periods. See Ofcom (2017b).
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and monitors but also by low turnout, protest, violence, system crisis, 
and the withdrawal of consent (see also Mackinnon 2012, 12). However, 
it is also the case that nondemocratic systems and authoritarian pseu-
dodemocracies can also be highly legitimate in the eyes of their popula-
tions, in part because of the lack of an independent media. In systems of 
“competitive authoritarianism,” open elections may be held, but a lack of 
real media independence undermines the process of open deliberation 
(Way and Levitsky 2002, 57– 58). Therefore, the concept of legitimacy 
proposed for this chapter is as follows: for an election or referendum to 
be legitimate, results must be accepted both by international standards 
bodies and the overwhelming majority of citizens. And by contrast, where 
many or most citizens, and/ or the majority of standards bodies and elec-
tion monitors say legitimacy is lacking, we can say an election is ille-
gitimate. Fundamentally election legitimacy is about perceived fairness. 
Increasingly, governance of mass media and also social media is required 
to guarantee such fairness.
With the rising importance of media in elections, and what some would 
even term the “mediatization of politics” (Garland, Couldry, and Tambini 
2017; Esser 2013; Kunelius and Reunanen 2016; Hepp 2013) monitors are 
increasingly taking notice of media system requirements in their assess-
ments. International standards bodies have outlined standards for the 
media. The obvious next point is whether those standards need to be 
updated for a period in which social media are increasingly displacing print 
and broadcasting.
CAMPAIGNS MOVE ONLINE
A growing number of researchers and commentators are concerned about 
data- driven political campaigning and message targeting on social media. 
The concerns include privacy (Howard 2006; Kreiss and Howard 2010; 
Cohen 2012; Barocas 2012); transparency (Kreiss and Howard 2010); 
campaign finance (Butrymowicz 2009); and the (in)ability of existing 
electoral laws to maintain a level playing field and thus election legiti-
macy (Pack 2015; Barocas 2012; Ewing and Rowbottom 2011; Tambini 
2017). Researchers have raised longer- term concerns with the undermin-
ing of the quality of deliberation; since 2016 the concern has been with 
the proliferation of messages that were either inconsistent with, or con-
tradictory to, other communications from a campaign. Or third- party 
messages that were deliberately designed to mislead or provoke. There is 
also a longer term worry about “political redlining,” that is, the ability to 
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target messaging on a narrow segment of the electorate (Barocas 2012) and 
exclude others, because they are less likely to vote or do not belong to key 
swing demographics; and with the overall transparency of political delib-
eration (Ewing and Rowbottom 2011). One area of concern that links these 
various claims is the notion that effective targeting may undermine voter 
autonomy: voters for whom social media is the dominant source of news 
and information could be inundated with a constant stream of skewed, 
politically interested messaging that would drown out opposing views; a 
new form of targeted propaganda.
Following the shock results of the 2016 Brexit referendum and the US 
election, a wide range of concerns were raised about social media campaign-
ing by a wider range of public commentators. The influence of deliberately 
targeted “fake news” messages, and the potential for foreign intervention 
in domestic campaigns, including spooky “psychometric profiling” have 
been raised by journalists such as Carole Cadwalladr of the Observer news-
paper (Cadwalladr 2017).
At the time of writing, several investigations into the use of targeting 
were ongoing: In addition to the US Special Prosecutor’s investigation of 
Russian involvement in the 2016 elections, The Information Commissioner’s 
office (the UK regulator for freedom of information and data protection) 
was examining the use of data for campaign purposes (Denham 2017); and 
an investigation by the UK electoral supervisor the Electoral Commission 
examined potential breaches of campaign funding reporting obliga-
tions relating to provision of database and targeting services by Leave.EU 
(Electoral Commission 2017). While the international agencies such as the 
OSCE that are responsible for electoral supervision and monitoring have 
been relatively slow to respond to the challenge of social media, the Council 
of Europe has carried out a feasibility study for a new recommendation on 
how democracies might regulate the new practices (Council of Europe 2017).
Despite this gathering storm of debate, there has been a lack of robust 
and disinterested information on how the campaigns actually work. 
Research into data- driven campaigning has tended to rely on interviews 
(Moore 2016; Anstead 2017), ethnography (Nielsen 2012), or legal analysis 
(Butrymowicz 2009). There is surprisingly little analysis of the messages 
themselves, or of the validity of some of the more worrying claims about 
new forms of propaganda. A  partial exception is Allcott and Gentzkow 
(2017). The key proposal of the theoretical literature, namely that the legit-
imacy of elections and referenda is undermined by these new campaigning 
tools, has not been tested, and there remains a rather large gap between 
hype (generally of the dystopian variety) and understanding of how tar-
geted campaigning on social media has in fact been deployed.
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THE BREXIT REFERENDUM 2016 AND GENERAL ELECTION 2017
The UK referendum of 2016, like the US election of the same year, led to 
a shock outcome.3 The discussion following the referendum predictably 
focused on why there was such a contrast with previous votes, and a ten-
dency to “blame” unwelcome political changes on the Internet. In particu-
lar, concerns were expressed about misinformation and “fake news” being 
distributed online without the skeptical filter of journalism, and about tar-
geted messaging online (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Commentators, who 
themselves had been sidelined by new opinion leaders online, looked for 
someone to blame, and Facebook was convenient.
In May 2017, after a series of shorter stories, Carole Cadwalladr pub-
lished a detailed “exposé” relating to opaque links, data sharing, and 
cross- funding between the UK referendum and the US Trump campaign. 
Cadwalladr closed the article arguing that “Britain in 2017  .  .  . increas-
ingly looks like a ‘managed’ democracy. Paid for by a US billionaire. Using 
military- style technology. Delivered by Facebook. . . . the first step into a 
brave, new, increasingly undemocratic world” (Cadwalladr 2017).
In the article she alleged not only that both campaigns were using sophis-
ticated data- driven social media targeting campaigns but also that there 
was a degree of cross- funding (through provision of benefits in kind such 
as data services), coordination of campaign data, and learning between the 
two campaigns. For the politically displaced, the story was attractive, as it 
offered support to the claim that the result was illegitimate.
In comparison with other advanced democracies, the UK has a very 
active online population, and users are particularly engaged on social 
media. More than 82% of British adults used the Internet daily or almost 
daily in 2016 according to the Office for National Statistics (ONS 2016), 
and 27% of online adults reported using Facebook on a daily basis. The 
Internet was according to Ofcom the only news platform with a growing 
number of users since 2013: 48% of UK adults say they use the Internet to 
get their news (Ofcom 2017a). According to the same report, 27% of UK 
adults say they get news from Facebook.
Social media, according to the data from a 2017 report, are the fastest 
growing news source sector: “overall, 47% of those who use social media 
for news say they mostly get news stories through social media posts, com-
pared to 30% in 2015.” This survey evidence is self- reported, and different 
surveys vary to an extent. According to the Reuters Institute Digital News 
3. The author acknowledges the excellent research assistance of Sharif Labo for this 
section.
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Report 2017 (reported in this volume), 41% say they use social media for 
“news” in the UK.
This shift online, and to social media, is reflected also in advertising 
spending, though estimates of spend vary. Between 2008 and 2016 the 
“digit al” (online) share of US political ad spend rose from 0% in 2008 to an 
estimated 10% in 2016 (E- Marketer 2016). Given evidence from interviews 
with campaign leaders (Tambini 2016), and spending returns to the UK 
Electoral Commission,4 much more than 10% of election marketing budgets 
is now spent on digital. In 2015, the first year in which digital spending was 
reported separately by the Electoral Commission, around 23% of the total 
spend was digital, with the majority of this being spent on Facebook (Electoral 
Commission 2016). In the United States, which remains dominated by TV 
spend, almost a billion dollars, or 10% of spend on political ads was forecast 
to be spent on online advertising in the 2016 election (E- Marketer 2016).
The reason for this rapid shift of campaign activity online is simple. Social 
media advertising appears to be more cost- effective than other less “smart” 
forms of advertising. Of particular interest to political strategists and cam-
paigners is the fact that data- driven campaigns offer superior targeting and 
audience- segmentation capabilities. Campaigns can get the messages they 
think will be most persuasive to people who are undecided but likely to vote, 
in the constituencies that might swing the election, or key voters in a ref-
erendum. What is attractive to advertisers is that they can target those key 
strategic voters with the messages that are most likely to swing those vot-
ers on the basis of demographic, political, and even potentially psychometric 
profiling. According to campaign leaders, strategists are following audiences 
online, and developing more sophisticated approaches to online advertising. 
This is generally combined with an attempt to develop shocking and resonant 
“shareable” messages to harness the organic sharing of propaganda online. 
According to Andy Wigmore, the campaign director of Leave.EU:
It didn’t matter what was said in the press. The more critical they were of us 
when we published these articles to our social media, the more numbers we 
got. So it occurred to us that actually Trump was onto something because the 
more outrageous he was the more air time he got, the more air time he got the 
more outrageous he was. . . . The more outrageous we were the more air time we 
got in the normal media and the more airtime— which was always critical— , 
the more support we got. . . . The more outrageous we were, we knew that the 
4. Researchers examined spending returns as they were published by the Electoral 
Commission and categorized the payees according to their basic function, in order to 
identify social media and other forms of spend.
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press were going to attack us, which is what they did. We are now anti- establish-
ment full throttle. The more outrageous we were the more attention we got. 
The more attention we got, the bigger the numbers. (Andy Wigmore, interview, 
September 2016)
How a Data- Driven Social Media Campaign Works
In order to gain a rich understanding of data- driven campaigning on social 
media we interviewed referendum campaign leaders.5 This builds on the work 
of Anstead (2017) and others. Seven semistructured interviews were conducted 
with a common template of questions designed to enable the campaigners 
to outline their approaches to data- driven campaigning, voter profiling, and 
social media messaging. The interviews were conducted in London August– 
November 2016, following the referendum to exit the EU. Three were con-
ducted on the phone/ Skype, and the others were conducted in person.
In practice, it is impossible to separate the mass media campaign from 
the social media campaign, and it is impossible to separate the “organic” 
social media campaign driven by “voluntary” sharing and liking and the 
use by campaigns of the commercial advertising services offered by social 
media. Effective campaigns use those three elements together. But in what 
follows the focus is on the paid element, which has particular implications 
for election legitimacy, and which often fuels and primes the organic social 
media campaign, which in turn feeds mass media with stories.
On the basis of the literature review and expert interviews carried out 
following the 2015 general election and the 2016 Brexit referendum, it is 
5. To gain an insight into the message- targeting and communications strategy of a 
modern political campaign we interviewed the key participants from the two officially 
designated sides:  Stronger In and Vote Leave. We were interested in speaking with 
people who had close operational detail of the campaign strategy; how the key mes-
sages were decided on, message sign- off and audience segmentation. We anticipated 
this would require authorization from senior figures in the campaign and so chose to 
approach these senior figures first and asked them to suggest people to speak with 
throughout the campaign organization. We e- mailed interview requests to the heads, 
deputy heads, and campaign managers. We secured interviews with Jack Straw and 
Lucy Thomas, the director and deputy director of Stronger In, and Matthew Elliott, the 
CEO of Vote Leave. These interviews provided the names of other individuals, consul-
tancies, and agencies involved in the campaigns that we subsequently approached as 
well as providing useful operational detail of the campaigns, especially on the Stronger 
In side. We also interviewed Andy Wigmore of Leave.EU. All interviews were tran-
scribed and analyzed according to a meaning- condensation process with a focus on 
ascertaining expert views on processes of segmentation and profiling. Respondents 
were asked to go on the record and did so. The following section is based on a thematic 
analysis of their responses.
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possible to outline the following generic stages in building a social media 
campaign (Figure 11.1 and 11.2):
 1. Building the audience. Using a wide range of database- building tech-
niques, campaigners build databases of potential supporters, link these 
to various forms of purchased and freely available data, such as the 
electoral register, existing party membership, and canvassing lists, cold- 
calling records, and “opt in” data- harvesting techniques such as surveys, 
competitions, and petitions, which are increasingly carried out online.
 2. Audience segmentation. There are various approaches to audience seg-
mentation, which combine the following types of criteria: (1) marginal-
ity: Is the voter situated in a constituency that is possible to win, that is, 
a target constituency? Is the voter undecided?; (2) the basic demographic 
information attached to this voter (e.g., gender, age, income, educa-
tion); (3) previous voting record (including likelihood of actually voting); 
(4) evidence of current opinions and “hot- button” issues; and (5) social 
media activity and degree of its influence. The different campaigns in 
2016 each had a slightly different approach to profiling, but each attached 
a score and a profile to each potential voter using data from the electoral 
role. In elections, parties are able to learn between elections, but in refer-
enda regulation requires them to “start from scratch” (Matthew Elliott, 
interview, September 2016) and destroy data on completion.
 4. Message creation and testing. The process of finding messages that are 
effective and resonate with potential voters has in recent years involved 
extensive “focus group” testing, and repetition of a narrow range of 
messages that have been vetted and signed off by senior politicians. The 
social media campaign, by contrast tends to be more dynamic, with mes-
sages devised and tested online throughout each day of the campaign 
using processes of “A/ B” testing, whereby messages are selected on the 
basis of their resonance rather than ideological or political selection.
 5. Message targeting and delivery. Many campaigners report that they are 
focusing more of their advertising spend on digital, and they are doing 
this because they have a clear sense that social media platforms in par-
ticular are much more cost- effective than for example, press, display, or 
direct mail marketing techniques. The question of whether specific mes-
sages are targeted on the basis of the segmentation and profiling tech-
niques described at (2) is the black box of research on social media and 
campaign targeting. Campaigners frequently claim that they are able to 
target messages on an individual basis, and serve individually targeted 
messages that are designed to appeal to particular demographic, educa-
tion level, psychological, or geographic groups.
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THE REFERENDUM: VOTER PROFILING AND SEGMENTATION IS 
GETTING SMARTER
All the campaigns used a wide combination of techniques to build the 
audience and profile and segment it. This involved complex modeling of 
relationships among demographic characteristics, previous expressions of 
opinion, and stated voting intentions. Such profiling can involve hundreds 
of data points from dozens of sources. As Will Straw, CEO of Stronger 
explained,
These were opinion groups with demographic characteristics. So for the segmen-
tation—  . . . they identified common traits based on how people answer specific 
questions. Such demographic characteristics as well, but mainly based on their 
answers to questions that have been asked. What that threw up was some really 
interesting characteristics of these different groups. So you could say that the 
average person in this segment would be better or worse off than average, would 
be overall younger than average, would get their media from the BBC versus 
newspapers versus online. Would have these attitudes to the EU. These other 
issues would be of interest to them. Whether they are members of particular 
groups and so on. So some quite good general information. Then throughout 
the campaign we used that sub- segmentation to drive our focus group work. 
So when we had focus groups, I think we had close to thirty focus groups over 
the course of the campaign, we would get— You might have four to eight dif-
ferent tables up the focus group depending on the size, but it would be a male 
heads versus heart and a female strong sceptic group [ . . . ] Then we would have 
monthly depth polls which went back through the segmentation and we could 
see how the segments were shifting, both in their total numbers but also in their 
views of the Referendum. Then we would underneath that be able to track how 
people responded to different questions, certainly immigration question or the 
economy. How were we best able to get our messages across to those different 
groups.
Given that this process of segmentation and profiling is subsequently 
used in order to determine to whom messages are addressed and which 
messages are addressed to those voters the cumulative effect of this data- 
driven profiling is of interest:  it is likely, for example, that this profiling 
procedure may inadvertently result in different messages being targeted 
on the basis of protected characteristics, such as ethnic or religious group-
ing. Profiling and segmentation has always taken place to an extent on a 
geographical basis; these new techniques merely offer a much cheaper and 
effective way of doing so and thus may raise new concerns (see Lynskey, 
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this volume). Profiling and segmentation has always taken place but rapid 
innovation makes individual level targeting much more efficient and 
sophisticated.
MESSAGE TARGETING AND DELIVERY
One of the striking things about all the major campaigns to leave the EU 
is that they both took the strategic decision to focus the majority of their 
resources and energy on Facebook. There was strong agreement that it was 
simply the most effective form of political advertising. All the leaders said 
that Facebook was crucial, and particularly the two Leave campaigns. Andy 
Wigmore claimed that his team made a strategic decision early in the cam-
paign to put the entire ad budget into Facebook. And this was true also of his 
counterparts in the other (official) Leave campaign, such as Matthew Elliott.
Elliott:  .  .  .  almost nothing went in traditional advertising. Maybe 
one or two things which were more aimed at the press and getting 
coverage, but almost nothing went on traditional advertising.
DT: A lot on social media and— 
Elliott: A load on social media, a lot of it geared towards the end of 
the campaign.
DT: So increasingly that social media spend is Facebook?
Elliott:  Facebook yes.
EU REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN FOCUS: EXPENSES FOR 
INDIVIDUALS WITH LESS THAN £250K SPEND
In order to further understand how the campaigns were approaching social 
media, and test some of the claims made by our interviewees, we also exam-
ined the Electoral Commission on returns on the referendum. Taking one 
illustrative example, the returns released in early 2017 show that social 
media now account for most of the spending of the major parties. While the 
overall sums are relatively small, due to the Electoral Commission spending 
caps, social media have become the largest recipient of advertising spend-
ing, with most of this going to Facebook (Figure 11.3, Table 11.1).
The data covers those campaigners that reported spend of between 
£10,000 and £250,000 at the EU Referendum. Any individual or organiza-
tion that intended to spend more than £10,000 was required to register as a 
 
 
SM
S 
M
ar
ke
tin
g
R
ec
ru
itm
en
t A
ge
nc
y
M
us
ic
Im
ag
e 
Li
ce
ns
in
g
M
ai
le
r 
D
el
iv
er
y
Pu
bl
ic
 P
ol
ic
y 
R
es
ea
rc
h
Se
ar
ch
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
Co
ns
ul
ta
nc
y
Po
lli
ng
/M
ar
ke
t R
es
ea
rc
h
M
ed
ia
 B
uy
in
g 
A
ge
nc
y
Pu
bl
ic
 A
ﬀa
ir
s 
Co
ns
ul
ta
nc
y
O
ut
 o
f H
om
e/
O
ut
do
or
 P
ri
nt
in
g
Po
lit
ic
al
 C
on
su
lta
nc
ie
s
O
th
er
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 C
on
su
lta
nc
y
Cr
ea
tiv
e 
A
d 
A
ge
nc
y
D
ig
ita
l A
ge
nc
y
M
er
ch
an
di
se
 B
ra
nd
in
g
PR
 A
ge
nc
y
Ec
on
om
ic
s 
Co
ns
ul
ta
nc
y
Pr
in
tin
g
M
ed
ia
 P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
A
ge
nc
y
N
ew
sp
ap
er
s 
A
dv
er
tis
in
g
So
ci
al
 M
ed
ia
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g
A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
A
ge
nc
y
So
ci
al
 M
ed
ia
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g/
D
at
a 
A
na
ly
tic
s 0
%
5%
10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
Ca
m
pa
ig
n 
A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
Ex
pe
ns
es
Fi
gu
re
 1
1.
3:
 C
am
pa
ig
n 
ad
 s
pe
nd
: b
re
ak
do
w
n.
So
ur
ce
: A
na
ly
si
s 
of
 E
le
ct
or
al
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
re
tu
rn
s.
[ 280 ] Politics
280
“permitted participant” and submit expenses to the Electoral Commission 
earlier than groups spending more than £250,000. A few parties who spent 
in excess of £250,000 submitted their expenses earlier. The expenses ana-
lyzed are in the categories of marketing, media, and market research. They 
make up 66% of the total expenses of £4.8 million reported. Expenses out-
side the campaign period are not included.
One difficulty we encountered analyzing this data is that a great deal 
of the advertising spend is channeled through intermediaries such as 
advertising agencies. Advertising agencies tend to be active across differ-
ent media. That said, the highest spend was in social media both through 
Table 11.1.  MARKETING, MEDIA, AND MARKET RESEARCH SPENDING TOTALS
Category Spend Percentage
TOTAL £3,172,565.83
Social Media Advertising/ Data Analytics £775,315.18 24%
Advertising Agency £715,059.35 23%
Social Media Advertising £368,085.52 12%
Newspapers Advertising £210,169.50 7%
Media Production Agency £203,565.10 6%
Printing £125,554.95 4%
Economics Consultancy £109,594.80 3%
PR Agency £90,006.22 3%
Merchandise Branding £78,805.80 2%
Digital Agency £62,371.99 2%
Creative Ad Agency £57,792.58 2%
Communications Consultancy £54,000.00 2%
Other £53,318.45 2%
Political Consultancies £41,730.00 1%
Out of Home/ Outdoor Printing £38,723.16 1%
Public Affairs Consultancy £33,382.80 1%
Media Buying Agency £28,583.80 1%
Polling/ Market Research £25,489.60 1%
Professional Services Consultancy £24,000.00 1%
Search Advertising £21,400.00 1%
Public Policy Research £16,034.10 1%
Mailer Delivery £13,034 0%
Image Licensing £10,133.00 0%
Music £9,000.00 0%
Recruitment Agency £5,016.00 0%
SMS Marketing £2,400.00 0%
Source: Analysis of Electoral Commission spending returns.
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agencies and directly. By examining the spending returns we found that 
most social spend went to Facebook. An important implication of this is 
that social media spend, which is growing to become a disproportionate 
size of the pie, is hardly broken down at all. It therefore becomes an obscure 
black box in regulated campaigns.
IS FACEBOOK BECOMING A ONE- STOP- SHOP FOR ELECTION 
CAMPAIGNING? SOME FINDINGS FROM THE LSE/ WHO 
TARGETS ME PROJECT
During the 2017 UK General Election the social enterprise Who Targets 
Me persuaded approximately 11,000 volunteers to download a browser 
plugin. The plugin scraped political advertising from their Facebook feeds 
and created a large database that contained the almost 4.5 million records 
of exposure to Facebook ads (Figures 11.4–11.7). Voters continued to vol-
unteer during the election campaign, and this, together with obvious self-
selection biases, means that the data is not a representative record of all 
the ad exposures, but it is a valuable record of a large sample of advertise-
ments that can provide some general indications of the kinds of activities 
of party political advertisers and of Facebook users.6
These initial results from the LSE/ Who Targets Me research collabora-
tion offer significant evidence that Facebook is not only an important part 
of the message delivery machinery for targeted advertising services but 
also is emerging into a one- stop- shop for fundraising, recruitment, profil-
ing, segmentation, message targeting, and delivery. This vertical integra-
tion of campaign services, and its operation by a company that in most 
of the globe is foreign, will have serious implications for future election 
legitimacy if it is to continue unchecked.
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGNING
The shift to social media therefore poses some serious potential concerns 
for election legitimacy but, partly because of the lack of transparency of the 
6. The dataset is a collection of 1,341,004 impressions of 162,064 unique Facebook 
advertisements. The data was gathered between May 27, 2017, and June 18, 2017, via 
a Chrome plugin installed by volunteers taking part in the Who Targets Me project 
(https:// whotargets.me/ ). The project is intended to capture and save the content of 
political Facebook ads served to participating volunteers, and more information on the 
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platform, and of the process of campaigning, claimsare difficult to assess 
through research. This fuels the conspiracy theories.
In addition to what seems to be a process of consolidation and vertical 
integration of campaign activity in one platform, namely Facebook, allega-
tions have been made of various forms of foreign involvement, biases in 
distribution of key messages, bias against small parties, bias against new 
entrants, bias against parties with socially diverse supporters, bias against 
certain campaign messages/ issues, and bias against certain groups of 
voters— so- called redlining (Kreiss 2012).
Such biases may be unintentional or deliberate. As a hypothetical exam-
ple, if a party or campaign emerged that was standing on a platform of 
breaking up social media companies, there would be a strong incentive 
for social media companies to undermine the visibility of that party. This 
example may, or may not be far- fetched, but parties already exist that 
propose radical, sometimes statist solutions that would be hostile to the 
economic model of the platform companies. Electoral supervision exists 
plugin and the team that developed it can be found at https:// whotargets.me/ about. 
Volunteers agreed that data could be scraped from their Internet browser when they 
viewed Facebook. This enabled researchers to monitor the different types of messages 
that were viewed. Graphs presented here outline the basic content of messages during 
the GE2017. Future research will analyze targetting strategies, content, and profiling.
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Figure 11.4: Total impressions of political ad per day.
Total number of ads served to our sample on Facebook during the election campaign. Note that the sample 
grew during the campaign, so this should not be seen as an indication of numbers of ads viewed.
Note: This is a count of the total number of ads served (unique ad impressions) per day to users with the 
Who Targets Me plugin installed. Data from May 30 has been removed from this graph, due to an error in 
the plugin on that day which caused an unknown number of duplicate ad impressions to be recorded on that 
day. The data on which this graph is based is a database of 1,341,004 adverts captured by the Who Targets 
Me project, of which 20,958 were judged to be political in nature on the basis of a filter applied to the names 
of the advertisers named as responsible for the ads. The filter sought to detect the main political parties by 
searching for text matches to *labour*, *conservative*, *liberal democrat*, *ukip*/*independence party*, 
*momentum* (where * is a wildcard and the search was case-insensitive) in the names of the advertisers.
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Figure 11.6: Ads containing the word *donat*.
The relatively high volume of ads containing the words “donate” or “donation” confirms that FB was a 
significant fundraising platform for parties throughout the campaign and even after it.
Note: This is a count of the total number of ads served (unique ad impressions) per day to users with the 
Who Targets Me plugin installed, filtered to include only ads (conservatively) run by political parties or allies 
(Labour, Momentum, Liberal Democrat, Conservative, UKIP) and containing particular keyphrases. Data 
from May 30 has been removed from this graph, due to an error in the plugin on that day which caused an 
unknown number of duplicate ad impressions to be recorded on that day. The data on which this graph is 
based is a database of 1,341,004 adverts captured by the Who Targets Me project, of which 20,958 were 
judged to be political in nature on the basis of a filter applied to the names of the advertisers named as 
responsible for the ads.
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Figure 11.5: Political posts containing the word “join.”
Posts containing the word “join” or “joining” were more evenly spread throughout the campaign. The high 
volumes indicate that parties were active in using Facebook as a recruitment campaign— to build their databases.
Note: This is a count of the total number of ads served (unique ad impressions) per day to users with the Who 
Targets Me plugin installed, filtered to include only ads (conservatively) run by political parties or allies (Labour, 
Momentum, Liberal Democrat, Conservative, UKIP) and containing particular keyphrases. Data from May 30 
has been removed from this graph, due to an error in the plugin on that day which caused an unknown number 
of duplicate ad impressions to be recorded on that day. The data on which this graph is based is a database of 
1,341,004 adverts captured by the Who Targets Me project, of which 20,958 were judged to be political in nature 
on the basis of a filter applied to the names of the advertisers named as responsible for the ads.
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to ensure that elections— and the deliberative processes that surround 
them— are seen to be fair. They are increasingly powerless to do so in the 
face of opaque platforms.
In order for elections to be legitimate, voter choices should be demon-
strably free and not constrained by propaganda or subject to any form of 
control or deceit. This is another reason why targeting has been an issue, 
and “filter bubble” (Sunstein 2001; Pariser 2011) concerns have arisen. 
While the “jury is out” on the extent to which intermediaries narrow or 
broaden access to sources of information (see Newman and Fletcher this 
volume; Ofcom 2017a; Helberger this volume) the danger of social media 
targeting offers new opportunities in election campaigns for those wish-
ing to shift opinion and votes with scant regard for the truth.
There have thus been important concerns about voter autonomy and 
new forms of manipulation and propaganda. According to the UK election 
lawyer Gavin Millar,
Section 115 of the 1983 Act creates an offence of “undue influence.” Amongst 
other things this [ . . . ] prohibits impeding or preventing the free exercise of the 
franchise by duress or any fraudulent device or contrivance. In its long history 
it has been used against priests and imams preaching politics to the faithful, 
as well as those who circulated a bogus election leaflet pretending to be from 
another party [ . . . ] To me the most concerning is the impact of the targeted 
Ads containing *vote* or *voting*
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Figure 11.7: Ads containing the word “vote” or “voting.”
Adverts from all parties containing the words “vote” or “voting.” These instructional posts cluster at the end of 
the campaign period.
Note: This is a count of the total number of ads served (unique ad impressions) per day to users with the Who 
Targets Me plugin installed, filtered to include only ads (conservatively) run by political parties or allies (Labour, 
Momentum, Liberal Democrat, Conservative, UKIP) and containing particular keyphrases. Data from May 30 
has been removed from this graph, due to an error in the plugin on that day which caused an unknown number 
of duplicate ad impressions to be recorded on that day. The data on which this graph is based is a database of 
1,341,004 adverts captured by the Who Targets Me project, of which 20,958 were judged to be political in nature 
on the basis of a filter applied to the names of the advertisers named as responsible for the ads.
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messaging on the mind of the individual voter. A  “persuadable” voter is one 
thing. A vulnerable or deceived voter is quite another. (Millar 2017)
Foreign intervention has been a feature of much of the public debate, 
particularly links between the Trump campaign and Russia and the Brexit 
campaign and the United States, and involvement of Russia in various 
elections in France and Germany. In the UK this has led to the Electoral 
Commission enquiring about the funding of the various leave campaigns 
for example.
It will be pointed out that allegations about social media bias and control 
are speculation. But speculation and conspiracy theory is what undermines 
trust in democracy. One of the basic premises of free and fair elections is 
that the contest is free and fair, and perceived as such. This is why simplicity 
and transparency are so important. While media system capture and bias 
is inevitable in a mass media system, whether that is one dominated by pri-
vate media, public media, or some variant (Hallin and Mancini 2004), those 
biases are by their nature transparent and obvious for everyone to see.
WAS IT FACEBOOK WOT WON IT?
If an election is swung by a private company it is more likely to lose legiti-
macy in the eyes of citizens and the international community.7 The evi-
dence from the UK is mixed: on the one hand, the mere fact that there has 
been a loud debate on these issues since the 2016 referendum suggests 
that data- driven campaigning has had a negative impact on election legiti-
macy. But others claim that this is simply sour grapes— losers question-
ing the process. There is something in both arguments and they are not 
mutually exclusive. Empirical data on the role of Facebook in the overall 
information ecology is ambivalent, in part because Facebook data is dif-
ficult to access.
Facebook is market- dominant as a social media company (particularly 
if we include Instagram and WhatsApp) but not as a media company. In 
terms of time spent, and survey reports on where people get their news, 
it is certainly not dominant. But in terms of deliberation and information 
gathering related to elections, it is becoming the crucial platform in some 
countries, which is reflected in the shift of UK political advertising onto 
7. The title of this section is a reference to an infamous front page headline in the 
British tabloid the Sun, which gleefully claimed the day after the 1997 election victory 
of Tony Blair that “it was the Sun Wot Won it.”
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the platform over the past five years. Facebook, in particular, is emerg-
ing as a vertically integrated one- stop- shop for fundraising, recruitment, 
database building, segmentation, targeting, and message delivery. As a 
result, there is a paradox: the complex process of deliberation and debate 
during an election cycle, the flow of ideas, memes, reversals of public 
opinion, and fluctuations of fortune of individual politicians is now more 
knowable than ever before. The problem, for most democracies, is that 
it is knowable by a company based in California that has no intention of 
sharing that knowledge with anyone, apart from those able to pay for it, 
without asking too many questions about what they will do with this data 
or where they are based.
This is not Facebook’s fault, but it is a fact, and in the history of elections 
it is a novel one. There are multiple sensitivities about foreign involvement 
in media systems. Most countries have maintained rules preventing for-
eign ownership of media companies under pressure from trade liberaliza-
tion (this after all is why Rupert Murdoch had to take US citizenship) and 
the United States, the UK, and most other mature democracies have spe-
cific laws that prohibit foreign involvement in campaign funding. So the 
mere fact of a private, foreign company having this position cuts across the 
spirit of these previously existing laws.
WHY DOMINANCE MATTERS
Until now, this chapter has focused on the implications for democratic 
legitimacy of data- driven social media– based election campaigns. The 
question that follows is to what extent this is a problem of dominance— 
or conversely whether increasing choice, plurality, and switching between 
social media platforms could mitigate any of these concerns.
The short answer is that dominance matters. A good deal of the concerns 
we have discussed would be allayed, to an extent by more competition and 
pluralism in social media platforms.
Censorship Effects
If a nondominant platform takes down a post, that could be described as 
editorial discretion. If a dominant platform takes down or blocks a post, a 
person or a topic, that is censorship. It is of little import whether the mate-
rial is taken down by a human due to a rule violation, or by an algorithm for 
reasons that are not understood. Dominant platforms censor.
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Prominence Effects
Platforms can also use their dominant position to promote messages. 
This has been most evident when Google and others took positions in 
relation to intellectual property and net neutrality discussions in the US 
Congress, and platforms have also lobbied on gay rights issues. This is of 
course what is traditionally done by newspapers, which is why they are 
subject to sector specific merger and competition rules that limit market 
concentration.
Propaganda Bubbles
If one company holds data on you, and one profile is sold on to advertisers 
and fed into the relevance algorithm that determines what you are exposed 
to, there is the danger that this single profile will determine the “filter bub-
ble” (Pariser 2011) effect of what you are exposed to. These are complex pro-
cesses, and as yet little understood (Helberger this volume; Newman and 
Fletcher this volume). In the context of elections, the “propaganda bubble” 
effect could undermine legitimacy if there is a genuine lack of exposure 
pluralism (Helberger 2012) such that individual autonomy and free will is 
undermined, and deliberation undermined. In other words, each citizen 
might be better served by living within multiple “filter bubbles” operated 
with separate data ecologies.
Lack of Competitive Discipline
Where there are high switching costs and consumer lock- in (Barwise and 
Watkins this volume) users may be less able to exert “democratic discipline” 
on platforms— for example by demanding greater control over personal 
data, more transparency about relevance and prominence, and due process 
and “put back” rights in relation to takedowns and blocking. There is increas-
ing evidence that Facebook is becoming a “one- stop- shop” for political cam-
paigns that need to gather, profile, segment, and target, and that consumer 
lock in due to a lack of data portability compounds the effects of this.
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances
Like branches of government, social media companies should be balanced by 
countervailing power; which can be provided by other social media companies.
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A dominant company like Facebook, particularly one that is offering a 
vertically integrated “one- stop- shop” for election services, is in a histori-
cally unique position, and as a foreign company it is a position that if left 
unchecked will be corrosive of trust and democratic legitimacy.
Some of this is speculation. Some of this, we will be told by Facebook 
and others, could be wrong. But that is, at least in part, the point: because 
of a lack of transparency, speculation is necessary. Because of opacity and 
speculation, electoral legitimacy and democratic legitimacy more widely, 
suffers. Plurality of platforms would provide an important safeguard to 
democratic legitimacy.
Social media are not transparent, and the shift of campaigns online 
undermines the principle of transparency. To a certain extent this 
directly undermines existing regulation. The Political Parties, Elections 
and Referendums Act in the UK places a number of requirements on par-
ties to be open about the funding and governance of campaigns. These 
exist so that citizens can be clear on who is behind any party of cam-
paign. For example, campaigns are obliged to label their leaflets and other 
materials that. In 2016, the Electoral Commission admitted that these 
transparency requirements were not possible to enforce effectively online 
(Electoral Commission 2016). In a world of leaflets, campaigns could sim-
ply provide “imprint” information in small print on each leaflet which 
specified which campaign was behind the leaflet, and voters (and journal-
ists and other campaigns) could find detailed information about the fund-
ing of that campaign on the Electoral Commission website. Social media 
advertising, where ad messages take a simpler format and do not include 
imprint information, was undermining that key tenet of transparency.
UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE CRISIS OF ELECTORAL LEGITIMACY
An election in the UK shares many of the features of a village fête. People 
gather in their local village hall or primary school and are met by volun-
teers puffed up with civic pride. Votes, like raffle tickets, are carried in bat-
tered steel boxes to bigger local secondary schools and counted by more 
local volunteers. The politicians wear retro rosettes, and tears are shed in 
the great climax of civic participation, when the teller, often in ceremonial 
garb, announces the count.
Part of the reason for the fusty process and archaic technology, in the 
era of big data and instant AI- driven feedback is ritual, and part of it is 
about trust. The two go together, and they are both important factors in 
the social construction of legitimacy.
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But the crucial factor in the legitimacy of elections is fairness. Profound 
political change and party realignment always involves contestation of 
legitimacy, and the events of 2016 and 2017 have been no exception. Both 
losers and winners have raised concerns about recent elections and refer-
enda, but there have been some themes that link them, and also concern 
social media: foreign interference, message targeting, and database- driven 
campaigning that subverts existing election supervision law.
While election designs can be complex, the principle and process of 
counting Xs on papers could not be more intuitive and widely understood. 
Transparency has extended to the process of information and to the cam-
paigns itself. While it is clearly the case that in free media systems private 
media exercise significant influence on the outcomes; the bias and selectivity 
of those media are there for everyone to see, and newspapers in particular 
have been freely selected by readers in part for the biases they represent in 
competitive markets regulated for competition, media plurality and diversity.
According to the tests set out earlier in this chapter, electoral legitimacy 
in the UK is still intact: international organizations and British subjects still 
view electoral processes as legitimate. But, particularly with regard to the UK 
Referendum, cracks are beginning to show. This chapter has examined how 
data- driven campaigning— and Facebook dominance— can undermine legit-
imacy. The wider issue here may be that while social media still in theory offer 
new opportunities for democracy, the increasingly commercial and increas-
ingly smart, data- driven social media may in the long term be on a colli-
sion course with the open, voluntary, equal public deliberation required by 
democracy. Some of the corrosive effects of social media can be mitigated if 
citizens are provided with the appropriate information and the tools needed 
to switch platforms and exert some competitive pressure. Continuing domi-
nance and monopoly positions, particularly by opaque foreign companies, 
are likely to be particularly corrosive of trust, fairness, and legitimacy.
Many of the issues raised in this chapter are features of social media 
per se, not any one platform or the fact of dominance. But, and here is the 
central point, dominance exacerbates the problem. Put in another way, an 
increased plurality of social platforms would go a long way to addressing 
many of them.
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